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The internalist about justification will have to hold that the beliefs of such subjects have the same justificatory status (they’re either both justified or both unjustified, and to the same degree), and the internalist about knowledge will have to hold that, so long as the beliefs of such “twins” are true in both cases, they can’t diverge on the matter of whether they constitute knowledge. This twin’s life was identical to mine up to midnight last night.At that time, our life histories drastically diverge, but not in any way causes a difference in what our experiences seem like from the inside: Our “internal” lives are still identical.short answer to our title question is that epistemology is the theory of knowledge.
The aliens who snatched my twin’s brain from his body are so advanced that they were able to do so in such a way that did not impact at all on his experience.
Now it is morning, and I have a conversation with my wife.
A skeptical thesis is typically a claim that the beliefs in a certain range lack a certain status.
In addition, then, to varying in their ; they can be views on which any of the designations discussed above in section 2 surprisingly fail to apply to a wide range of our beliefs.
Epistemology, then, is the branch of philosophy that deals with questions concerning the nature, scope, and sources of knowledge.
In what follows, I’ll briefly describe a few of the issues epistemologists deal with.” (Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123 [in the journal Analysis, volume 23, published in the year 1963, on pages 121-123]), available on-line here. According to this account, then, you know that it’s raining outside, for example, if and only if it is true that it’s raining outside, and you believe that it’s raining outside, and you are justified in so believing.Gettier’s target is an initially tempting account of knowledge: the “JTB” account, as it’s often called, which analyzes knowledge as justified true belief. To refute such accounts, Gettier advanced two examples, each of which involve (or at least intuitively seem to involve) instances of justified true belief that nonetheless fail to be instances of knowledge.Most internalists accept that the external matter of whether a belief is true is relevant to the issue of whether it constitutes knowledge, so on the issue of knowledge, internalism is usually the position that only or primarily internal factors are relevant to whether beliefs constitute knowledge.The epistemic externalist, on the other hand, claims that issues of knowledge and/or justification depend exclusively or primarily on such factors as how the belief was caused or how reliable is the faculty or mechanism by which the subject came to hold the belief — matters which are not in the requisite way “internal” to the subject’s point of view, as can be seen by the fact that you can imagine two subjects whose mental lives are identical with respect to how things seem to them from their own point of view, but whose beliefs diverge with respect to the matters in question.At midnight, super-advanced aliens snatched my twin’s brain from his body, placed it in a (human)-brain-sustaining vat, and hooked it up to a super-advanced computer, that, taking into account the output of the brain that is my twin, gives it appropriate sensory input.Meanwhile, we may suppose, I remain a normally embodied human, with no aliens anywhere around me.(And what constitutes our evidence for our beliefs, and when does a belief need to be supported by evidence in order to be rational?) All of these are epistemological topics in their own right, of interest beyond what contribution an understanding of these concepts might make in a successful account of knowledge.The attention paid here is in part due to the presence of powerful skeptical arguments that threaten to show that skeptical assessments of the scope of our knowledge are actually correct.A central epistemological obsession has been showing what is wrong with these skeptical arguments — or, occasionally, arguing that there’s nothing wrong with them.